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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 890623-CA 
v. : 
NATHANIAL LEE BELL, ; Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of assault by a 
prisoner, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-102.5 (1978). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1) Was sufficient evidence presented at trial to 
sustain defendant's conviction for assault by a prisoner? 
2) Did the trial court commit reversible error in its 
instruction to the jury on reasonable doubt? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The relevant text of any applicable constitutional 
provisions and statutes for a determination of this case are set 
forth in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Nathaniel Lee Bell, was charged with assault 
by a prisoner, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1978) (R. 15-16). On September 26, 1989, a 
jury trial commenced before the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, 
Judge by assignment, Fifth Judicial District Court, Iron County, 
Utah (R. 36). The same day, the jury returned a verdict of 
guilty as charged (R. 38-39; T. 121-22). Defendant waived time 
for sentencing, requesting immediate imposition of sentence (R. 
39; T. 124). Defendant was sentenced to the statutory 
indeterminate term of zero to five years, to run concurrently 
with any other sentences defendant was then serving (R. 39, 69-
72; T. 128). Defendant filed his notice of appeal on October 17, 
1989 (R. 75). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant, Nathaniel Lee Bell, is a convicted felon 
who, in 1989, was serving sentences in the Utah State Prison for 
aggravated burglary and aggravated sexual assault (T. 74-5). 
From November, 1988 to May, 1989, defendant was housed in the 
Iron County-Utah State Correctional Facility in Cedar City, Utah, 
a regional housing facility of the prison (T. 74-75). 
On April 13, 1989, while in the Iron County Facility, 
defendant and several other inmates were playing handball. 
Defendant's partner was inmate Dan Richardson; their opponents 
were inmates Nicholas Baughn (Banner) and Carry Hartmann (T. 30). 
These same inmates had played against each other several times 
previously, oftern resulting in arguments, especially between 
defendant and Hartmann (T. 40, 53, 80). 
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On the day in question, the game had begun in its usual 
manner, with some verbal arguments developing as the game 
progressed (T. 31). Typical of the previous games, defendant and 
Hartmann began to continuously disagree with each other, both 
having "a habit of being overbearing on the court" (T. 30). Both 
were claiming that the other was "in the way", blocking any 
opportunity to return the ball (T. 54, 84). The arguments became 
more heated until finally defendant told Hartmann, "You get in my 
way again . . . come hell or high water, I'm running over your 
f ing ass" (T. 32, 55). Immediately after this statement, the 
ball was put back into play. Hartmann was to return defendant's 
serve. Nicholas Baughn (Banner) observed: 
Mr. Hartmann had run up to hit the ball, 
which he did. He hit the ball, but in so 
doing his inertia, his forward inertia in 
hitting that ball caused him to brush up 
against the back of Nathaniel Bell. Mr. Bell 
was, you know, obviously, standing there 
watching the former wall, waiting for the 
ball to come back. In handball you don't 
turn around and look behind you. So Gary 
[sic], when he returned the ball, his inertia 
just brushed up against the back of Mr. Bell, 
and he sort of brushed off the back of him 
and kind of bumped into the side wall. 
(T. 33, 55). According to Mr. Banner, defendant then came up 
"right along side [of Hartmann] and hit him, and hit him right in 
the jaw" (T. 34). Banner continued: 
I was dumbfounded. I was shocked. 
[Defendant] hit him, and I saw Mr. Hartmann's 
eyes, he was knocked out on his feet. I 
mean, his eyes just went around in his head, 
and they were glazed over, and he just fell 
like along, he just fell straight back and 
hit his head on the gymnasium floor. 
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(T. 34). As Hartmann laid on the floor, Banner saw "blood 
bubbling out of his mouth, and I started to see a pool of blood 
forming around his head" (T. 35). Medics were called and 
Hartmann, still unconscious, was transported by ambulance to the 
hospital (T. 35, 37). 
Banner's account of the incident was consistent with 
the victim's recollection. Carry Hartmann testified that in 
going for the ball, he lightly touched defendant on the back 
(T. 56). Hartmann said "excuse me" and then may have hit the 
wall (T. 59). From that point on, he could not recall anything 
until he regained consciousness in the ambulance while being 
transported to the hospital (T. 56-57). 
Defendant testified on his own behalf (T. 73-99). He 
admitted that he had been "bending the rules" in playing the 
handball game by not giving his opponents, Banner and Hartmann, a 
fair opportunity to return the ball (T. 84). He claimed that 
both he and Hartmann had been doing this to each other throughout 
the game (T. 84). Defendant testified that he had been 
previously stabbed in prison and was especially concerned about 
receiving any blows to the abdomen (T. 77). Defendant claimed 
that as Hartmann went for the ball, Hartmann hit defendant in the 
stomach, causing defendant to bend forward (T. 85). Defendant 
responded "without thinking" and hit Hartmann in the mouth and 
jaw area with a closed fist (T. 85, 99). Hartmann fell to the 
floor, his eyes rolling back, unconscious (T. 86). Defendant 
asserted that he did not intend to harm Hartmann in hitting him. 
Rather, 
when [Hartmann] did this, I really didn't 
know what else, I do know that my trick had 
worked. I had turned the aggression around. 
I had caused him to be more angry at me than 
I was at him. I had frustrated him because 
what he was doing to me, I was doing to him, 
and it was more frustrating. 
(T. 92). Instead of Hartmann falling down unconscious, defendant 
had "hoped that he would at least have, was looking at me, that 
he would at least block the punch, and then we would have had a 
confrontation. And that's what I wanted" (T. 98). 
Despite defendant's claim that Hartmann had initially 
hit him, no other witnesses corroborated this statement. Both 
the victim, Hartmann, and his partner, Banner, denied that 
Hartmann had ever hit defendant (T. 33, 40, 57). Another inmate, 
Frank Mills, who was the lineman in the game, could not "recall 
[Hartmann] hitting Mr. Bell, although I'm not certain he didn't"; 
however, he did hear Hartmann say "excuse me" as he went pass 
defendant to return the ball (T. 45, 47, 51). Mills further 
testified that Hartmann had been standing still when defendant 
hit him, causing Hartmann to lose consciousness before even 
hitting the floor (T. 46, 50). When Hartmann hit the floor, 
[h]e was shaking and making some odd sounds 
with his mouth and nasal passages, and he was 
bleeding from the mouth and nose, and in the 
matter of seconds was bleeding from his rear 
portion of his head. 
(T. 46). 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged (T. 
121-22). Against the advice of his attorney, defendant waived 
time for sentencing, asking the court to impose sentence 
immediately (T. 124). Defendant was sentenced to the statutory 
term of zero to five years, to run concurrently with any other 
sentences defendant was then serving (T. 128). 
Other facts, relating to the jury instructions given, 
will be discussed as appropriate to the argument. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence presented at trial, together with all 
reasonable inferences, is sufficient to sustain defendant's 
conviction for assault by a prisoner. 
The trial court properly instructed the jury as to the 
state's burden of proving all elements charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The court's instruction as to what constituted 
reasonable doubt was correct under Utah case law. Further, any 
error in the instruction would be harmless in light of other jury 
instructions given and the overwhelming nature of the evidence 
against defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL TOGETHER WITH 
ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES IS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR ASSAULT BY 
A PRISONER. 
Defendant contends that the evidence adduced at trial 
is insufficient to support his conviction of assault by a 
prisoner as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1978) which 
reads: 
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending 
to cause bodily injury, is guilty of a felony 
of the third degree. 
Assault is defined under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1978) as 
being: 
(a) An attempt, with unlawful force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(b) A threat, accompanied by a show of 
immediate force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-101 (1978) further defines "prisoner"; 
however, here there is no dispute as to defendant's status as a 
prisoner. The jury was fully advised as to these definitions and 
each requisite element of the offense. (See R. 49-68, Court's 
Instructions to the Jury, Instructions No. 5, 6 and 7). No issue 
has been raised on appeal as to the adequacy of the instructions, 
but for, the reasonable doubt instruction which will be discussed 
in Point II of this brief. 
The standard for review of a sufficiency of the 
evidence challenge is well-established by the Utah appellate 
courts. 
[T]he evidence and the reasonable inferences 
which may be drawn therefrom must be viewed 
in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict. A jury conviction is reversed for 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, 
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. . . . 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989). Accord State 
v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Further, 
since a jury is in the best position to give "proper weight to 
the peripheral nature of [any] contradictory testimony," State v. 
Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1988): 
It is not this court's duty to measure 
conflicting evidence or the credibility of 
witnesses. That responsibility belongs 
strictly to the trier of fact. "It is the 
exclusive function of the jury to weigh the 
evidence and to determine the credibility of 
the witnesses. So long as there is some 
evidence, including reasonable inferences, 
from which findings of all requisite elements 
of the crime can reasonably be made, [the 
court's] inquiry stops." . . . 
Id. at 27 (citations omitted), quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 
342, 345 (Utah 1985). Accord State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475 
(Utah 1989) . 
Turning to the facts established at trial and their 
reasonable inferences, it is clear that defendant, while a 
prisoner, stuck the victim, Carry Hartmann, causing him bodily 
injury (T. 34-35, 46, 56, 85-86). It is equally clear that prior 
to defendant's hitting of Hartmann, the two were involved in a 
verbal argument in which defendant threatened that he would "run 
over" Hartmann the next time they came in contact during the game 
(T. 32, 44, 55). Immediately thereafter, when Hartmann touched 
defendant, defendant hit the victim with such force that he 
knocked him unconscious with a single blow (T. 34-35, 46, 56, 85-
86). While defendant claimed that he never intended Hartmann to 
hit the floor, splitting open his head and causing bleeding, the 
nature and strength of the blow caused Hartmann injury before he 
ever hit the floor. It knocked him unconscious while on his feet 
(T. 34, 46). Under the facts, there is amble evidence to support 
the jury's conclusion that defendant struck Hartmann, intending 
to cause him bodily injury. 
The only element remaining is whether defendant hit 
Hartmann unlawfully, that is, without legal justification. At 
defendant's request, the court instructed the jury that: 
A person is justified in using force against 
another when and to the extent that he 
reasonably believes that such force is 
necessary to defend himself against such 
other's imminent use of unlawful force. 
(R. 60, Instruction No. 12; Compare R. 35, defendant's Requested 
Instruction No. 3 ). While defendant claimed that he hit 
Hartmann only in response to Hartmann's striking him, the 
evidence was to the contrary. No one, other than defendant, 
testified to Hartmann hitting defendant. No one, other than 
defendant, testified that the hit was significant enough that 
defendant went forward. Instead, all other witnesses testified 
that Hartmann was doing nothing but standing still when hit by 
defendant. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Hartmann 
had hit defendant, the jury would still have been justified in 
concluding that defendant assaulted Hartmann. For, even the 
defendant admitted that he was attempting to provoke Hartmann, to 
make Hartmann sufficiently "frustrated", that a "confrontation" 
would occur (T. 92). Defendant was disappointed that Hartmann 
was unconscious because defendant could not then continue the 
fight (T. 97-98). Where conflicting evidence exists as to a 
claim of self-defense, it is the jury's prerogative to reject the 
claim. State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701, 703 (Utah 1985). 
When the evidence is taken as a whole and the proper 
standard of review applied, it is clear that there is more than 
sufficient evidence to sustain defendant's assault conviction. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTES A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court committed 
reversible error in its instruction to the jury on reasonable 
doubt. However, in making his argument, defendant does not point 
to any specific language in the instruction as inaccurate or 
incorrect. Instead, defendant appears to argue that under State 
v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989), any instruction on 
reasonable doubt must necessarily include the language that "in 
order to convict a Defendant [the jury] must have an abiding 
conviction of the Defendant's guilt upon which they would act in 
the most critical and irrevocable matters in there [sic] own 
affairs" (Br. of App. at 4). Such a position is without merit. 
Defendant misconstrues the concerns expressed by the 
Utah Supreme Court as to the inclusion in reasonable doubt 
instructions of the terms "more weighty affairs of life" and 
"mere possibility" or "imaginary doubt". State v. Ireland, 773 
P.2d at 1380, including Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion at 
1380-81; State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989), including 
concurring opinions of J. Stewart at 1147, and J. Zimmerman at 
1149. For while the Court has directed that these terms not be 
utilized, the Court has never mandated that particular language 
be included. State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1380. Instead, the 
standard remains that jury instructions must be construed as a 
whole; and, a conviction will be overturned only if a defendant 
can show that he was prejudiced by the instruction such that the 
outcome of the case would have likely been different. State v. 
-i n-
Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1146, 1149. Accord Holland v. United 
States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (reasonable doubt instruction 
may be misleading standing alone, but acceptable when read as a 
whole with other jury instructions); United States v. Hall/ 854 
F.2d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 1988) (no constitutional infringement 
occurs where instructions as a whole properly instructed the jury 
as to defendant's presumption of innocence and the government's 
burden of proof). 
Further, it is the exclusive province of the trial 
court to instruct the jury on relevant law. 
Accordingly, the judge may, over the 
objection of the defendant's counsel, give 
any instruction that is in proper form, 
states the law correctly, and does not 
prejudice the defendant. State v. Piper, 113 
Ariz. 390, 393, 555 P.2d 636, 639 (1976). 
However, all instructions are subject to the 
general and overreaching rule that the judge 
must make it clear to the jury that the 
defendant has "no particular burden of proof 
but [is] entitled to an acquittal if there 
[is] any basis in the evidence from either 
side sufficient to create a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant [is] guilty of the 
offense." State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 
(Utah 1980) . . . . 
State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986). 
Here, the trial court fully and correctly instructed 
the jury that defendant was entitled to the presumption of 
innocence (R. 51, Instruction No. 3), that the state carried the 
burden of proving all essential elements of the crime charged 
(R. 53, Instruction No. 5; R. 54, Instruction No. 6) and that the 
state must prove that the defendant acted with the requisite 
intent (R. 56, Instruction No. 8). Additionally, the court gave 
an "alternative reasonable hypothesis" instruction, entitling 
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defendant to an acquittal if there existed two reasonable 
interpretations of the evidence (R. 59, Instruction No. 11) and 
self-defense instruction (R. 60, Instruction No. 12). Compare 
United States v. Alonzo, 681 F.2d 997 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 
459 U.S. 1021 (1982) ("alternative reasonable hypothesis" 
instruction unnecessary where reasonable doubt instruction is 
given). Accord United States v. Rucker, 586 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 
1978) (defendant not entitled to "two conclusion" instruction 
where the jury is properly instructed on government's burden to 
prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt). Thus, only in the 
context of the totality of the instructions, can the reasonable 
doubt instruction be judged. 
Here, the trial court instructed the jury that: 
A reasonable doubt is a fair doubt based 
upon reason and common sense and one which 
reasonable men and women would have after a 
consideration of all the evidence or lack of 
evidence in the case. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that 
degree of proof that satisfies the mind and 
convinces the understanding of those who are 
bound to act conscientiously upon such proof. 
If after an impartial consideration and 
comparison of all of the evidence or lack of 
evidence in the case you can honestly say 
that you are not convinced and satisfied of a 
defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable 
doubt. 
(R. 52, Instruction No. 4). 
The first paragraph of the trial court's instruction 
consistent with all previously approved reasonable doubt 
instructions. State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1379-80 ("[a] 
reasonable doubt is one based on reason"); State v. Johnson, 77 
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P.2d at 1145-46 (a reasonable doubt "must arise from the evidence 
or lack of evidence in the case"); State v. Tillman/ 750 P.2d 
546, 572-73 (Utah 1987) ("by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt 
that is based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of 
all the evidence"). It also parallels the language held 
permissible by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, a circuit 
that discourages the giving of any instruction on reasonable 
doubt.1 United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 
1988) (the phrase "fair doubt" is "neutral, indicating an 
application of fairness;" and, while possibly unhelpful to a 
jury's understanding, its use "does not impinge upon the 
2 
reasonable doubt standard"). 
The second paragraph of the court's instruction is 
exactly the same as that approved of in State v. Tillman, 750 
P.2d at 572-573 ("[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt is that 
degree of proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the 
understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon 
it"). The language was again favorably reviewed in State v. 
Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1145-46, where identical language was used 
At least two federal circuits have admonished their district 
courts not to define reasonable doubt "because often the 
definition engenders more confusion than does the term itself", 
United States v. Martin-Trigona, 684 F.2d 485, 493 (7th Cir. 
1982). Accord United States v. Velazquez, 847 F.2d 140 (4th Cir. 
1988). But while discouraged, neither circuit holds it to be 
reversible error for a court to instruct a jury as to reasonable 
doubt. 
2 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has recently instructed its 
district courts to discontinue the use of "fair doubt" or any 
other redefining or "refining" of reasonable doubt. But in doing 
so, the circuit court did not find the use of "fair doubt" to be 
reversible error. United States v. Campbell, 874 F.2d 838, 843 
(1st Cir. 1989) . 
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in the first sentence of that court's instruction no, 11, which 
instruction was criticized on other grounds in the concurring 
opinions. See concurring opinions of J. Stewart and J. 
Zimmerman, IdL at 1147 and 1149. 
The third paragraph parallels that approved of in State 
v. Tillman, 750 P.2d at 572-573 (M[i]f after an impartial 
consideration and comparison of all the evidence in the case you 
can candidly say that you are not satisfied of the defendant's 
guilt, you have a reasonable doubt"); and State v. Johnson, 774 
P. 2d at 1145-1146 ("[i]f after an impartial consideration and 
comparison of all the evidence, you can honestly say that you are 
not satisfied of the defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable 
doubt; but if, after such impartial consideration and comparison 
of all the evidence, you can truthfully say that you have abiding 
conviction of the defendant's guilt such as you would be willing 
to act upon in the more weighty and important matters relating to 
your own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt"). However, it is 
clear that the trial court, knowing the admonition of the Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1380, to 
discontinue the use of the language "more weighty and important 
matters relating to your own affairs," deleted the offending 
portion of the Johnson instruction. As such, this third 
paragraph is actually closer to the type of instruction approved 
of by Justice Stewart in both his dissent in Ireland, 773 P.2d at 
1381, and his concurring opinion in Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1148. 
3 
The lower court's instruction also conformed substantially with 
approved federal form instructions. See Manual of Model Criminal 
Jury Instructions for the Ninth Circuit (1989 Ed.), Form 
Taken as a whole, it is clear that the court's 
instructions to the jury retained the burden of proof on the 
state to prove all elements of the charge beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Even if the reasonable doubt instruction had contained 
or failed to contain any more appropriate language, such error 
would be harmless in light of the totality of the jury 
instructions and overwhelming evidence against defendant. State 
v. Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1146, 1149; State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 
913, 919-920 (Utah 1987) . 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /^h day of March, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Cont. Instruction No. 3.03, Reasonable Doubt-Defined: 
A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon 
reason and common sense, and may arise from a 
careful and impartial consideration of all 
the evidence, or from lack of evidence. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that 
leaves you firmly convinced that the 
defendant is guilty. 
If after a careful and impartial 
consideration with your fellow jurors of all 
the evidence, you are not convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant is 
guilty, it is your duty to find the defendant 
not guilty. On the other hand, if after a 
careful and impartial consideration with your 
fellow jurors of all the evidence, you are 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
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